[영문 번역] 형이상학, 아리스토텔레스, 1권 4장

4.

 

One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the genesis of the universe, says:— Love first of all the Gods she planned.

어떤 사람은 아마도 헤시오도스가 이와 같은(세상을 아름답게한 운동의 원인)것을 찾으려한 최초의 사람이라고 추측하거나 파르메니데스가 그랬던 것처럼 사랑이나 욕망을 존재하는 것들 중의 원리로 정립한 다른 어떤 인물이 그랬다고 추측할 것이다. 왜냐하면 우주의 생성을 구성하는데 있어서 그는 에로스가 모든 신 중 처음으로 계획되었다고 말하기 때문이다.

And Hesiod says:—

First of all things was chaos made, and then

Broad-breasted earth...

And love, ‘mid all the gods pre-eminent,

그리고 헤시오도스는 말한다. 모든 사물 중 첫번째로 혼돈이 만들어졌고, 그 다음 가슴이 넓은 땅과… 그리고 모든 신들 가운데 탁월한 에로스가 생겼다.

which implies that among existing things there must be from the first a cause which will move things and bring them together.

이것은 태초부터 존재하는 모든 것들 가운데에는 사물들을 운동시키고 결합시키는 원인이 있어야만 한다는 것을 함축한다.

How these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery let us be allowed to decide later;

이러한 사상가들이 누가 먼저 발견했는지에 관련해서 어떻게 배열될지는 나중에 결정하도록 하자.

but since the contraries of the various forms of good were also perceived to be present in nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the ugly, and bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of qualities.

그러나 다양한 형태의 좋은것들의 반대들이 자연에 내재해 있는 것으로 또한 지각되었기 때문에, 즉 질서와 아름다움뿐 아니라 무질서와 추함이 있다고 지각되고 (그리고)나쁜 것들이 좋은것듧다 더 많다고 지각되고, 천한 것들이 아름다운 것들보다 더 많이 존재한다고 지각됐기 때문에, 그러므로 다른사상가(엠페도클레스)는 분쟁과 사랑 이 둘 각각을 두 부류의 성질들 가운데 하나의 원인으로 도입했다.

 

 

For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of bad.

왜냐하면 만약 우리가 엠페도클레스의 관점을 따르고 그의 미숙한 표현에 따라서가 아니라 이것의 의미에 따라서 그의 견해를 해석한다면, 우리는 반드시 사랑이 좋은 것들의 원인이고 분쟁은 나쁜 것들의 원인임을 알아내기 때문이다.

Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all goods is the good itself.

그러므로 만약 우리가 엠페도클레스가 어떤 의미에서 좋음과 나쁨을 둘 다 원리로써 주장했고 맨 처음 그렇게 주장했다 말한다면 우리는 아마도 반드시 옳을 것이다. 왜냐하면 모든 좋은 것들의 원인은 좋음 자체이기 때문이다.

These thinkers, as we say, evidently grasped, and to this extent, two of the causes which we distinguished in our work on nature-the matter and the source of the movement-vaguely, however, and with no clearness, but as untrained men behave in fights; for they go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do not fight on scientific principles, and so too these thinkers do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent.

우리가 말하듯이 이러한 사상가들은 우리가 자연에 관한 우리의 저작에서 구분했던 원인들(4가지)중 두가지, 즉 질료와 운동의 근원을 명백하게 그리고 그정도까지 파악했던 것은 분명하지만 모호하고, 불명확하게, 마치 미숙한 사람이 싸움에서 행동하는 것 같다. 왜냐하면 그들은 그들의 적을 빙빙돌고 종종 좋은 공격을 적중시키지만 그들은 과학적 원리들의 위에서 싸우는 것은 아니고 또한 이러한 사상가들 역시 자신들이 무엇을 말하는지 알지 못하는 것처럼 보이기 때문이다. 왜냐하면 일반적으로 그들이 적은 범위를 제외하고는 그들의 원인들을 사용하지 않는 것은 명백하기 때문이다.

For Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.

왜냐하면 아낙사고라스는 세계의 생성을 설명하기 위해 정신을 기계장치로써 사용하고, 어떤 원인에 의해 어떤 것이 필연적으로 있는지를 말하지 못할 때 그는 정신을 끌어들이지만 다른 모든 경우에는 정신이 아니라 어떤 것의 사건들을 원인으로 제시하기 때문이다.

And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use.

그리고 엠페도클레스는 비록 이것(아낙사고라스)보다 더 넓게 원인들을 사용하지만 충분치 않고 그들의 사용에 있어서 일관성을 갖지 못한다.

At least, in many cases he makes love segregate things, and strife aggregate them.

적어도 많은 경우들에 있어서 그는 사랑은 분리를 낳고 분열은 결합을 낳게 만들었다.

For whenever the universe is dissolved into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of the other elements;

왜냐하면 분열에 의해 우주가 이것의 요소들로 분해되는 때는 언제나 불이 결합되어 하나가 되고 다른 각각의 요소들도 그렇다.

but whenever again under the influence of love they come together into one, the parts must again be segregated out of each element.

그러나 다시 사랑의 영향하에서 그 요소들이 함께 모여 하나가 될 때는 언제나 각 부분들이 반드시 각각 요소들로 분리될 수 밖에 없기 때문이다.

Empedocles, then, in contrast with his precessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause, not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources.

엠페도클레스는 그의 선배들과 반대로 이런 원인(운동인)의 구분을 도입한 최초의 사람인데 운동의 원인을 하나로 정립한 것이 아니라 다르고, 반대의 원인들을 도입한 최초의 사람이다.

Again, he was the first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only; he treats fire by itself, and its opposite-earth, air, and water-as one kind of thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.

다시 그는 네가지 질료적 요소들을 말한 최초의 사람이다. 그러나 그는 네가지를 사용하지 않고 마치 두 가지가 다인것처럼 그것들을 다룬다. 그는 불을 그 자체로 다루고 이것의 반대인 흙, 공기, 물을 한 종류의 것처럼 다룬다. 우리는 아마 이것을 그의 시들을 공부함으로써 배울 수 있을 것이다.

This philosopher then, as we say, has spoken of the principles in this way, and made them of this number.

우리가 말하듯 이 철학자는 이러한 방식으로 원리들에 관하여 말해왔고 이 수만큼 원리들을 정립했다.

Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being-the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things.

레우키포스와 그의 동료 데모크리토스는 충만과 공허가 요소들이라 말했고 하나를 한정된 것이라 부부르 다른 것을 한정되지 않은 것 이라 부르고/단단하고 꽉찬 것은 규정되어 있는 것, 빈것을 규정규정 않은 것 (따라서 그들은 규정된 것이 규정되지 않은것보다 더 많이 있지 않다고 말하는데 왜냐하면 단단한 것은 공허한 것 못지 않게 존재하기 때문이다). 그리고 그들은 이것을 사물들의 질료적 원인으로 여겼다.

 

 

And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities.

그리고 배후에 놓여있는(근본적) 실체를 하나라 여기는 사람들은 이것의 양태들에 의해 다른 모든 것들이 생성시킨다고 보고, 느슨하고 빽빽한 것이 양태들의 요소들이라 가정하는데 이와 같은 방식으로 이러한 철학자들도 요소에 있어서 차이들이 모든 다른 성질들의 원인들이라 말한다. 이러한 차이에는 세 가지, 즉 모양,질서,위치가 있다고 그들은 말한다.

These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by ‘rhythm and ‘inter-contact’ and ‘turning’; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, M from W in position.

Dhosigkas 그들이 말하길 실재하는 것은 오직 모양과 상호접촉과 회전에 의해 차이가 드러나기 때문이다. 그리고 이것 중 모양은 형태이고 상호접촉은 질서이며 회전은 위치이다. 왜냐하면 A는 N과 모양에 있어서 다르고 AN은 NA와 질서에 있어서 다르며 M은 W와 위치에 있어서 다르기 때문이다.

The question of movement-whence or how it is to belong to things-these thinkers, like the others, lazily neglected.

그러므로운동에 관한 물음과 운동이 어떻게 사물들에 속하는가에 대한 물음은 이러한 사상가들도(원자론자) 다른이들과 마찬가지로 등한시하여 무시했었다.

 

 

Regarding the two causes, then, as we say, the inquiry seems to have been pushed thus far by the early philosophers.

그렇다면 우리가 말하듯이 두 가지 원인들(질료인,운동인)에 관한 탐구는 이전철학자들에 의해 이 정도까지 진행되어 온 듯 보인다.

 

*영어 원문은 Ross의 번역입니다.